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Building a trading platform is not simply a matter of creating market charts, adding buy and sell buttons, and connecting an application to a brokerage or exchange API. A production-grade trading platform must protect identities, financial information, trading permissions, account sessions, API credentials, and sensitive transaction activity from a wide range of security threats.
Among all these responsibilities, secure user accounts deserve particular attention.
A compromised trading account can have consequences that are much more serious than a compromised account on an ordinary consumer application. An attacker who gains access to a trading account may be able to view sensitive financial information, change account settings, obtain private documents, manipulate orders, access linked payment methods, or misuse API credentials.
For that reason, security should not be treated as a feature added near the end of development. It should influence the architecture, authentication model, database design, API layer, frontend experience, monitoring strategy, and operational processes from the beginning.
This guide explains how to build a trading platform with secure user accounts, covering authentication, authorization, identity verification, session management, encryption, multi-factor authentication, account recovery, fraud detection, API security, database protection, secure trading workflows, monitoring, compliance considerations, testing, and long-term maintenance.
The goal is not merely to make account login difficult for attackers. The goal is to create a security architecture that protects the complete account lifecycle.
A trading platform with secure user accounts is a software system that allows customers to register, authenticate, manage personal information, access financial data, monitor markets, and perform trading activities while enforcing strong controls over identity, authorization, data protection, and transaction security.
The platform may support stocks, ETFs, bonds, derivatives, commodities, cryptocurrencies, foreign exchange, or other financial instruments.
Regardless of the asset class, the fundamental security principle remains the same:
A user should be able to perform only the actions they are legitimately authorized to perform.
A secure account architecture typically includes:
The authentication system therefore becomes one part of a much larger security ecosystem.
Trading applications process information that can be financially and personally sensitive.
Consider what a typical user account might contain:
A successful account takeover could therefore expose considerably more than a username and password.
There is another major difference between trading applications and ordinary applications.
A normal application may allow an attacker to access personal information.
A trading application can potentially allow an attacker to take financial actions.
That means the platform should distinguish between:
These actions should not necessarily have identical security requirements.
Building secure user accounts for a trading platform introduces several interconnected challenges.
Attackers may obtain credentials through:
The platform must assume that attackers will continuously attempt to gain access.
Even when login credentials are valid, the person operating the account may not be authorized to execute a particular sensitive operation.
For example, a user could log in successfully from a new device, but the platform may require additional verification before allowing a high-risk transaction.
Trading platforms increasingly rely on APIs.
If an external API key is stolen, an attacker may potentially interact with a connected trading account without using the platform’s normal login interface.
Security architecture must also account for privileged employees, administrators, support agents, and infrastructure operators.
No employee should automatically have unrestricted access to customer accounts.
A trading platform may depend on:
Each integration introduces another trust boundary.
Before development begins, establish a formal security model.
Start by identifying:
Examples include:
Identify what must be protected:
List sensitive actions:
Then determine how each asset or action could be compromised.
This process creates the foundation for a threat model.
Threat modeling should happen before significant application development.
A useful process is:
For example, imagine this flow:
User → Mobile App → API Gateway → Authentication Service → Trading Service → Brokerage API
Every arrow represents a communication boundary.
Security should be evaluated at each stage.
A common mistake is to secure the frontend while assuming the backend is trusted.
The backend must independently validate every security-sensitive operation.
Registration is the first stage of the account lifecycle.
A secure registration process should avoid collecting unnecessary information.
At minimum, depending on the product and jurisdiction, the registration process may require:
For regulated financial products, registration may eventually connect to a KYC process.
Implement:
Do not trust data simply because it came from your frontend.
Every important field must be validated server-side.
Email verification helps establish control over the email address associated with an account.
A secure verification process should use a short-lived, unpredictable verification token.
The token should:
Avoid putting sensitive account information directly into verification URLs.
The server should look up the verification record associated with the token.
Passwords remain common, but password security depends on implementation.
A trading platform should never store passwords as plaintext.
It should also avoid reversible encryption for password storage.
Instead, passwords should be processed using a modern password hashing algorithm designed to resist offline attacks.
Examples include:
The appropriate configuration should be selected according to current security guidance and infrastructure capabilities.
Passwords should also be protected against:
A password hash should not be treated as ordinary application data.
If an attacker obtains the user database, strong password hashing increases the difficulty of recovering the original passwords.
The system should also use unique salts as part of password hashing.
Never design authentication around:
password = SHA256(password)
A fast general-purpose hash is not an appropriate password-storage mechanism.
Instead, use a password-specific hashing function with an appropriate work factor.
The application should also consider:
Multi-factor authentication, commonly called MFA, is one of the most important controls for a trading platform.
The concept is simple.
Authentication should use more than one category of evidence.
Examples include:
For financial applications, MFA should be strongly considered for:
Passkeys provide another modern authentication option.
They are based on public-key cryptography rather than traditional passwords.
The private credential remains protected by the user’s device, while the service stores a corresponding public key.
This can reduce exposure to:
For a modern trading platform, supporting passkeys alongside other authentication options can improve both security and user experience.
However, recovery and device-loss procedures must be designed carefully.
A highly secure authentication mechanism is not useful if legitimate users cannot safely recover their accounts.
A secure login system should consider more than username and password validation.
A login attempt can be evaluated using signals such as:
Risk-based authentication can then determine whether additional verification is required.
For example:
Known device + normal location + valid credentials + MFA
Result:
Normal access.
New device + valid credentials + MFA
Result:
Allow access but notify the user.
New device + unusual location + suspicious behavior
Result:
Require additional verification or temporarily restrict sensitive actions.
Login endpoints should be protected by rate limiting.
Without rate limits, attackers can submit large numbers of authentication attempts.
Rate limits can be applied using multiple dimensions:
However, rate limiting must be implemented carefully.
A simplistic account-only lockout could allow an attacker to intentionally lock out another user’s account.
A better approach combines several controls.
Brute-force protection can include:
The objective is not simply to block a certain number of attempts.
The objective is to make automated attacks economically and technically difficult while minimizing disruption to legitimate users.
After authentication, the platform needs to maintain a secure session.
Poor session management can undermine otherwise strong authentication.
A secure session architecture should consider:
For a financial platform, long-lived sessions deserve careful evaluation.
Convenience should not automatically override security.
When cookies are used for authentication, security attributes should be configured appropriately.
Important cookie properties include:
These controls reduce exposure to several classes of browser-based attacks.
When token-based authentication is used, token storage also requires careful design.
Sensitive tokens should not be casually stored in browser-accessible storage.
The architecture should consider the consequences of XSS, token theft, session fixation, and compromised devices.
A common modern authentication architecture uses short-lived access tokens and longer-lived refresh mechanisms.
The basic concept is:
User authenticates → short-lived access credential → API access → refresh when required
Short-lived credentials reduce the window of opportunity if a token is stolen.
Refresh mechanisms should also be protected.
A mature implementation can use refresh-token rotation and server-side tracking to identify suspicious reuse.
The exact architecture should be chosen according to the platform’s clients, API design, infrastructure, and threat model.
Users should have visibility into active sessions.
A security page might display:
Users should be able to revoke sessions they do not recognize.
For example:
iPhone 16
Last active: 10 minutes ago
Location: Approximate region
[Sign out]
This creates a valuable defense against account takeover.
Account recovery is frequently overlooked.
A system may have extremely strong login security but become vulnerable through a weak password-reset process.
Recovery flows should therefore receive the same security attention as login.
Potential recovery mechanisms include:
The recovery process should not become an easier path into the account than the normal login process.
A password-reset token should be:
The application should avoid revealing whether an email address belongs to an account through overly specific error messages.
For example, rather than displaying:
This email does not have an account.
A safer response can communicate that the request has been processed without unnecessarily exposing account existence.
After a password reset, the platform should evaluate whether existing sessions should be revoked.
For a trading platform, revoking or revalidating sessions after major credential changes is often a sensible security control.
Trading platforms that operate in regulated financial markets may need identity verification and KYC processes.
KYC can involve:
The exact requirements depend on the business model, asset class, jurisdiction, licensing structure, and applicable regulations.
KYC should not be treated as simply a form submission.
The platform must protect the identity documents and personal information involved.
Not every account should have the same permissions.
Role-based access control, or RBAC, allows the system to assign permissions according to roles.
For example:
| Role | Typical Access |
| Customer | Own account and trading functions |
| Support Agent | Limited customer support information |
| Compliance User | Compliance workflows |
| Operations User | Operational workflows |
| Administrator | Carefully controlled administrative capabilities |
| Security Administrator | Security operations |
Permissions should be explicit.
Avoid building a system where every internal user receives broad access and restrictions are enforced only through process.
Role-based access control alone may not be sufficient.
The platform should also evaluate resource ownership.
For example:
Can this user view this portfolio?
Can this user cancel this order?
Can this user change this bank account?
Can this employee access this customer’s KYC record?
The authorization layer should answer these questions independently of the frontend.
A request should never be considered authorized simply because a user knows an account ID or order ID.
Authentication proves identity.
Authorization determines what the authenticated user can do.
This distinction is essential.
A user who successfully logs in should not automatically receive permission to perform every sensitive action.
For example:
Authentication
This is the account owner.
Authorization
The account owner is permitted to place this order.
Transaction security
The requested transaction satisfies the platform’s security and risk requirements.
These are separate decisions.
A secure architecture should keep authentication and authorization conceptually separate.
For example:
Authentication Service
|
v
Identity established
|
v
Authorization Layer
|
v
Permission evaluation
|
v
Trading Service
This makes the system easier to audit and evolve.
It also reduces the risk of putting security logic into random application controllers.
Order placement is one of the most security-sensitive workflows in a trading platform.
A simplified flow could be:
User
↓
Authenticated Session
↓
Order Interface
↓
API Gateway
↓
Authorization
↓
Order Validation
↓
Risk Controls
↓
Order Management System
↓
Brokerage/Exchange
Each stage should perform appropriate validation.
The client should never be trusted to determine whether an order is valid.
A secure order service should validate:
The platform should also protect against request manipulation.
For example, a malicious user should not be able to modify a request and change:
accountId=123
to:
accountId=124
and gain access to another account.
Authorization must occur server-side.
Some operations may warrant additional confirmation.
Examples include:
Step-up authentication can provide additional protection.
For example:
Password
+
MFA
+
Transaction confirmation
The goal is not to make every click painful.
Instead, stronger controls should be applied proportionally to risk.
A secure trading platform should consider account takeover scenarios.
Suppose an attacker successfully obtains:
The platform should still have additional barriers.
MFA can be one.
Risk-based controls can be another.
Additional transaction verification can provide another layer.
Behavioral monitoring can detect:
These signals can trigger additional controls.
Trading platforms are heavily dependent on APIs.
Every API endpoint should be designed as a security boundary.
Security considerations include:
Never assume that an endpoint is safe simply because the UI does not expose it.
Attackers can call APIs directly.
A trading platform may connect with external brokers or exchanges.
Integration credentials must be treated as high-value secrets.
Use:
If an external service provides separate permissions for reading balances and executing trades, avoid requesting broader permissions than required.
Never expose sensitive API credentials in:
API secrets should be stored in a secure server-side secrets-management system.
Where possible, encrypt sensitive credentials at rest.
Access should be limited to services that genuinely require them.
Sensitive information stored in databases, backups, object storage, and logs should be protected.
Encryption at rest can protect data if storage media or backups are improperly accessed.
However, encryption alone is not enough.
The encryption key itself must also be protected.
A common architectural mistake is:
Encrypted database
+
Encryption key stored beside database
This offers much less protection than a properly designed key-management architecture.
All sensitive communications should use secure encrypted transport.
This includes communication between:
TLS configuration should be maintained and monitored as infrastructure evolves.
A trading platform database may contain highly sensitive information.
Security should include:
Application services should not normally connect using a database superuser.
Create dedicated identities with only the permissions they need.
Personal data should be collected only when there is a legitimate business or regulatory reason.
Examples include:
Security teams should also understand where each category of data is stored.
Create a data inventory that answers:
Financial information deserves additional protection.
Examples include:
Access should be logged where appropriate.
Administrative personnel should not have unrestricted visibility into customer financial information simply because they work for the company.
Secrets can include:
Do not hard-code secrets into source code.
Do not store them casually in configuration files committed to repositories.
Use a dedicated secrets-management solution or cloud-native equivalent with access controls, auditing, and rotation capabilities.
Cloud platforms can provide powerful security capabilities, but they do not automatically secure an application.
A secure cloud deployment should consider:
Cloud permissions should follow least privilege.
A trading platform can be divided into security zones.
For example:
Internet
|
v
CDN / WAF
|
v
API Gateway
|
v
Application Services
|
+—— Authentication
|
+—— Trading
|
+—— Portfolio
|
v
Data Layer
Database services should generally not be directly exposed to the public internet.
Web applications should use appropriate security headers.
Depending on architecture, useful controls can include:
Security headers should be tested rather than copied blindly.
A Content Security Policy, for example, should reflect the actual application architecture.
Frontend code should be considered untrusted.
Never rely on frontend controls for authorization.
For example, hiding an “Admin” button does not prevent an attacker from calling the underlying API.
The backend must independently verify:
The frontend is a user interface, not a security boundary.
Backend services enforce the actual security model.
A secure backend should use:
Avoid returning excessive information in API errors.
An error should help legitimate developers diagnose problems without giving attackers a map of the infrastructure.
Mobile trading apps require additional considerations.
Security features may include:
However, mobile security controls should not replace server-side security.
The server must assume the client could be modified.
Security notifications can help users identify account compromise quickly.
Useful alerts include:
Notifications should avoid exposing sensitive data.
Fraud prevention should operate alongside authentication.
A risk engine can evaluate signals such as:
The risk score can determine whether an action should:
A trading platform can establish behavioral baselines.
Suppose a user normally:
Then suddenly:
That combination should increase risk.
Security decisions should ideally consider multiple signals rather than relying on one indicator.
Account takeover prevention should use multiple layers:
Layer 1: Strong credentials
Layer 2: MFA
Layer 3: Session security
Layer 4: Device intelligence
Layer 5: Behavioral monitoring
Layer 6: Transaction controls
Layer 7: User notifications
Layer 8: Incident response
No single mechanism should be expected to stop every attack.
Transaction monitoring can identify unusual activity after authentication.
For example:
Normal account behavior
↓
Sudden password reset
↓
New device
↓
New withdrawal destination
↓
Large transaction
The combined sequence is much more suspicious than any individual event.
This is why event correlation is valuable.
Security logs should record important events such as:
Logs should be protected from unauthorized modification.
Logging without monitoring provides limited protection.
Security operations should establish alerts for suspicious events.
Examples include:
Alert thresholds should be tuned to minimize unnecessary noise.
Financial platforms benefit from strong auditability.
An audit trail can answer:
Audit records can be essential during investigations and operational disputes.
Administrative accounts deserve exceptional protection.
They should ideally use:
Avoid shared administrator accounts.
Every privileged action should be attributable to an individual identity.
Customer support can accidentally become an account-takeover channel.
Support representatives should not reset security controls based solely on information that an attacker could know.
High-risk requests should have stronger verification.
Examples include:
Support workflows need security controls just like APIs do.
Third-party vendors can introduce risk.
Before integrating a provider, evaluate:
The platform should know exactly what information is being sent to each vendor.
Security should be integrated into every development phase.
Identify threats.
Define security boundaries.
Use secure coding practices.
Perform automated and manual security testing.
Protect infrastructure and secrets.
Track security events.
Patch vulnerabilities and update dependencies.
This is often more effective than trying to add security immediately before launch.
Security testing should include:
Security testing should cover both expected and malicious behavior.
Before launching a high-value trading platform, independent penetration testing can help identify weaknesses.
Testing should include:
The most important point is remediation.
A penetration test that produces a report but does not result in meaningful fixes provides limited value.
Security vulnerabilities will continue to appear after launch.
Establish a process for:
Critical vulnerabilities should receive urgent attention.
Security is not only about preventing attacks.
It is also about recovering from failures.
Backups should be:
A backup that has never been restored is not a proven recovery mechanism.
Create an incident response plan before an incident occurs.
The plan should identify:
Time matters during a security incident.
Preparation reduces confusion.
Financial platforms may be subject to multiple regulatory and security obligations.
Requirements depend heavily on:
Depending on the product, considerations may involve privacy regulations, financial regulations, identity verification requirements, cybersecurity obligations, and industry standards.
Compliance should be designed into the product architecture rather than treated solely as a documentation exercise.
Legal and compliance professionals should determine which requirements apply to a particular trading business.
A secure trading platform can be built using many technology combinations.
A possible architecture might include:
Technology selection should be based on requirements rather than trends.
A high-level architecture could look like this:
Internet
|
v
CDN / WAF Layer
|
v
API Gateway
|
+————+————+
| |
v v
Authentication Service Application Services
| |
| +——–+——–+
| | | |
| v v v
| Trading Portfolio Account
| |
| v
| Risk Controls
| |
| v
| Order Service
| |
| v
| Broker / Exchange
|
v
Identity Provider
|
v
Data Services
|
+————+————+
| | |
v v v
User DB Trading DB Audit Logs
Sensitive services should be isolated according to risk.
A practical development process can follow these phases.
Define:
Design:
Design:
Build security controls alongside core functionality.
Perform:
Use controlled environments and secure CI/CD.
Monitor security, performance, and availability.
Patch, test, audit, and improve.
The cost of building a secure trading platform varies significantly.
Major cost drivers include:
A basic prototype can be relatively inexpensive compared with a production financial platform.
The difference comes from the engineering depth required for reliability, security, scalability, and regulatory readiness.
Several mistakes repeatedly appear in financial software projects.
Login is only the beginning.
Attackers can bypass frontend controls.
Credentials should never be casually committed to repositories.
Password security depends heavily on the hashing mechanism.
A stolen session can bypass password authentication.
Recovery can become the easiest attack path.
Internal accounts require least-privilege controls.
Successful authentication does not guarantee legitimate behavior.
Without reliable audit records, investigations become difficult.
Security should be designed from the beginning.
Use this checklist when building secure trading accounts.
Security architecture will continue to evolve.
Several technologies are particularly relevant.
Passwordless authentication can reduce dependence on reusable passwords.
Machine learning and statistical analysis can identify unusual account behavior.
Authentication requirements can dynamically respond to risk.
Platforms can evaluate device reputation and behavioral history.
Every request can be treated as potentially untrusted rather than assuming that internal network traffic is safe.
Real-time analytics can identify suspicious transactions and account activity.
Modern devices can protect authentication keys using hardware-backed security mechanisms.
Developing a secure trading platform requires more than ordinary web development experience.
Look for a technology partner with experience in:
The partner should also understand that security requirements can influence architecture from the earliest stages.
For organizations looking for a custom software development partner, Abbacus Technologies positions itself as a provider of custom web, mobile, cloud, and software development services and has experience delivering technology projects for businesses.
When evaluating any development company, however, the decision should be based on relevant technical capability, security processes, project experience, communication, architecture quality, and the ability to provide long-term maintenance.
It is useful to summarize the complete account lifecycle.
User
↓
Registration
↓
Validation
↓
Email Verification
↓
Identity Verification
↓
MFA Setup
↓
Account Activated
Credentials
↓
Risk Evaluation
↓
MFA
↓
Session Creation
↓
Device Registration
↓
Account Access
Authenticated User
↓
Permission Check
↓
Account Status Check
↓
Order Validation
↓
Risk Controls
↓
Order Management
↓
Broker / Exchange
↓
Execution Result
↓
Audit Event
User Request
↓
Authentication
↓
Risk Assessment
↓
Step-Up Authentication
↓
Authorization
↓
Change
↓
Security Notification
↓
Audit Record
This layered approach is considerably stronger than simply protecting the login page.
One of the most important lessons when building a trading platform is that account security does not begin at login and end at logout.
The lifecycle looks more like:
Registration
↓
Verification
↓
Authentication
↓
Session
↓
Account Management
↓
Trading
↓
Withdrawals / Sensitive Actions
↓
Security Monitoring
↓
Recovery
↓
Account Closure
Each stage introduces different risks.
Registration requires identity controls.
Authentication requires credential protection.
Sessions require token security.
Trading requires authorization and transaction controls.
Recovery requires strong identity verification.
Account closure requires data retention and deletion procedures.
Security therefore needs to follow the user throughout the entire lifecycle.
A useful feature for a trading platform is a dedicated security center.
The dashboard could include:
This gives users greater visibility into their security posture.
Security should not make a trading application unnecessarily frustrating.
If users face excessive verification for ordinary actions, they may search for unsafe workarounds.
The best approach is risk-based security.
Low-risk activities can remain convenient.
High-risk actions receive stronger protection.
For example:
Viewing portfolio
Normal authentication may be enough.
Changing password
Require reauthentication.
Removing MFA
Require stronger verification.
Changing withdrawal destination
Require step-up authentication and potentially additional review.
This balance can improve both security and usability.
Before production launch, ask:
If the answer to several of these questions is no, the platform is probably not ready for production financial activity.
Building a trading platform with secure user accounts requires a security-first architecture rather than a simple login system.
A reliable platform must protect users throughout the complete account lifecycle, from registration and identity verification to authentication, session management, trading, account recovery, and account closure.
Strong password hashing, multi-factor authentication, passkeys, secure sessions, role-based access control, resource-level authorization, encryption, secrets management, API security, fraud detection, transaction monitoring, audit trails, and incident response all work together to create a resilient security model.
The most important principle is that security should be layered.
No single security feature can protect a trading platform against every attack. MFA can reduce credential-based risk, but it cannot replace authorization. Encryption can protect stored data, but it cannot stop an authorized session from performing a malicious action. Fraud monitoring can detect unusual behavior, but it should not replace strong authentication. Penetration testing can uncover weaknesses, but those weaknesses must actually be fixed.
A mature trading platform therefore treats security as an ongoing engineering discipline.
The development process should begin with threat modeling and continue through architecture, implementation, testing, deployment, monitoring, incident response, and continuous improvement.
For businesses planning to build a custom trading platform, the right development strategy is to design security into the foundation rather than attempting to add it after the core trading functionality has already been built.
The result should be more than a platform where users can log in securely. It should be a complete financial technology environment where identity, permissions, transactions, data, infrastructure, and operational processes are protected as one interconnected system.
That is what turns a trading application into a trustworthy trading platform.
Start by defining the security and regulatory requirements, then design authentication, authorization, session management, data protection, trading controls, fraud detection, logging, and incident response into the architecture. Use strong password hashing, MFA or passkeys, secure sessions, encryption, least-privilege access, and server-side authorization.
A strong implementation can combine password authentication with MFA or passkeys. The exact approach depends on the target users, risk profile, supported devices, and regulatory environment.
MFA is strongly recommended for financial applications because passwords alone can be compromised through phishing, credential stuffing, malware, and password reuse.
Passwords should not be stored as plaintext or reversible encryption. They should be processed using an appropriate password hashing algorithm such as Argon2id, bcrypt, or scrypt with secure configuration.
Use layered controls including MFA, secure sessions, rate limiting, device intelligence, suspicious-login detection, transaction monitoring, user notifications, and strong account recovery procedures.
API credentials should remain server-side where possible and should be stored using a secure secrets-management system. Permissions should follow least privilege, and keys should be monitored and rotated.
Yes. Sensitive data should be protected both during transmission and while stored. Encryption key management must also be designed securely.
Authentication should be combined with server-side authorization, account-status checks, order validation, risk controls, transaction monitoring, and step-up authentication for selected high-risk actions.
Authentication determines who the user is. Authorization determines what that authenticated user is allowed to do.
The cost depends on platform complexity, supported assets, number of applications, integrations, authentication requirements, KYC, fraud prevention, security testing, infrastructure, compliance requirements, and ongoing maintenance. A simple prototype and a production financial platform can have dramatically different budgets.
Yes. Existing systems can be strengthened through MFA, improved password storage, secure sessions, authorization controls, encryption, API protection, monitoring, and security testing. However, legacy architecture may require deeper redesign if fundamental security assumptions are weak.
Testing should cover authentication, authorization, APIs, sessions, account recovery, trading workflows, infrastructure, mobile applications, dependencies, and business logic. Independent penetration testing can provide another layer of assurance.
Attackers may target password-reset and support workflows instead of attempting to break normal authentication. Account recovery therefore needs security controls comparable to the login process.
Yes. Important authentication, account-management, administrative, and trading events should be recorded in appropriately protected audit logs. This improves security investigations, operational visibility, and accountability.
Do not trust the client. Every sensitive operation must be independently authenticated, authorized, validated, monitored, and recorded by trusted server-side systems.
A secure user account is not simply an email address, password, and login screen.
For a trading platform, it is a security boundary connecting identity, financial information, permissions, sessions, devices, APIs, transactions, and operational controls.
The strongest platforms approach that boundary systematically.
They minimize trust, enforce least privilege, authenticate strongly, authorize every sensitive action, encrypt valuable data, monitor unusual behavior, maintain detailed audit trails, and continuously test their defenses.
That approach provides the foundation needed to build a trading platform that users can trust with highly sensitive financial activity.
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